Exegesis of Descartes' Regulae, Pt. 4
Continuing with our commentary on Descartes’ Regulae; this is a very early work of Descartes in which he first introduces the notion of the mathesis univeralis that was to have so much influence on early modern science. In these commentaries, we have explored how much the early Descartes would have been influenced by the Aristotelian science that was educated in, in the universities. To what extent is the early Regulae reflect Descartes’ later “substance dualism.” I contend that the early Descartes of the Regulae can be read as still largely within the Aristotelian tradition, though there are some signs of his break with it. It seems to me that this early Descartes of the Regulae would like to give the Aristotelian science a greater precision, and perhaps separate his philosophical inquiry from more faith based kinds of questions that may not be fruitful for scientific inquiry, or human reason.
And yet we should not be surprised to find that plenty of people of their own accord prefer to apply their intelligence to other studies, or to Philosophy. The reason for this is that every person permits himself the liberty of making guesses in the matter of an obscure subject with more confidence than in one which is clear, and that it is much easier to have some vague notion about any subject, no matter what, than to arrive at the real truth about a single question however simple that may be.
But one conclusion now emerges out of these considerations, viz. not, indeed, that Arithmetic and Geometry are the sole sciences to be studied, but only that in our search for the direct road towards truth we should busy ourselves with no object about which we cannot attain a certitude equal to that of the demonstrations of Arithmetic and Geometry.
This goes back to the question about Pascal’s wager – that it is much easier to have an opinion about a vague subject, where the bounds and rules and disciplines of that subject are not clear, than to discover a real truth about a single subject with simple rules and bounds.
In other words, on those subjects about which no one really knows the truth it is easy to venture an opinion, and it is little risk to do so, because there are not real criterion for being wrong or right, and a fanciful opinion can make one seem learned. But it is much more difficult and less fanciful to solve a simple within the bounds of a given constraint, where there is a definite right and wrong answer.